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The 2016 EU International Procurement Instrument’s Amendments to the 2012 Buy 
European Proposal: A Retrospective Assessment of Its Prospects 
 
Kamala Dawar1 
 
Abstract 
This paper assesses the European Commission’s 2016 Amended Proposal for ‘a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the access of third-country goods and services to the 
Union’s internal market in public procurement and procedures supporting negotiations on access of 
Union goods and services to the public procurement markets of third countries.’2 The proposed 
regulation aims to improve the conditions under which EU businesses can compete for public 
contracts abroad. It provides the EU with leverage through imposing a price penalty on any tender 
for an EU procurement which is originating in a country that does not offer the EU ‘reciprocity’ in 
access to its procurement markets. 
After introducing the 2016 International Procurement Instrument (IPI) Amended Proposal, the 
paper examines the legal framework of the Amended Proposal with reference to its evolution from 
the European Commission’s original 2012 proposed regulation.  The analysis then turns to the 
concept of reciprocity, which serves as the justificatory basis of the Commission’s proposal before 
assessing the 2016 Amended Proposal’s compatibility with the EU’s commitments under the WTO, 
including most notably the World Trade Organization’s Government Procurement Agreement 
(WTO GPA), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures (ASCM). This assessment concludes by questioning the compatibility 
of this proposed regulation with the EU’s obligations under the WTO as well as the objectives of the 
EU procurement rules, underpinned by Treaty principles. 
 
 
Introduction  
The European Commission has noted that it has not exercised its power to regulate the access of 
foreign goods, services and companies into the EU’s public procurement market, except in certain 
utilities sectors. And as a result, approximately €352 billion in value of EU public procurement is 
open to bidders from member countries of the WTO agreement on government procurement 
(GPA), while this market access is not matched by other countries. The estimated value of US 
procurement offered to foreign bidders is currently just €178 billion, €27 billion for Japan, and 
even less for China.3  
In seeking to address this perceived imbalance, in 2012 the European Commission advanced its 
own version of a ‘Buy national’ proposal to regulate the access of third-country goods and 
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services to the EU’s internal market in public procurement. 4  The 2012’s Proposal made its 
passage through the European Institutions until January 2016, when the Commission released an 
amended Proposal to address some of the concerns raised about the original proposal. The 2016 
IPI Amended Proposal seeks to bring improvements to the initial initiative. It has finetuned this 
proposal to allow the EU to take proportionate and more targeted action – by providing leverage 
in negotiations – but without closing EU markets or adding any unreasonable burden for 
contracting authorities.5  
After introducing the 2016 International Procurement Instrument (IPI) Amended Proposal, in 
Section 1, the paper then examines the legal framework of the Amended Proposal with reference 
to its evolution from the original 2012 proposed regulation in Section 2. In Section 3, the analysis 
turns to the concept of reciprocity, which is the basis of the Commission’s proposal. Section 4 
assesses the 2016 Amended Proposal’s compatibility with the EU’s commitments under the 
WTO, including most notably the World Trade Organization’s Government Procurement 
Agreement (WTO GPA), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM).  
This analysis of the 2016 IPI Amended Proposal concludes, in Section 5, that the draft regulation 
is crafted along the lines of the US Buy America Act 2009, implemented under the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act during the fiscal recession in the US. Moreover, the evidence 
suggests that the Buy American Act did indeed offer leverage to open up procurement markets 
internationally. Nevertheless, this examination contends that the legal and policy framework of 
the 2016 draft regulation could still operate to undermine the principles and objectives of 
multilateralism under the GATT/WTO and the plurilateralism provided under the WTO GPA. It 
could further conflict with the overall purpose of the EU procurement rules which is to reflect the 
principle of value for money.6 Value for money is to be achieved through competition, unless 
there are compelling reasons to the contrary. This analysis questions whether the EU’s 
justification of this proposal in terms of achieving reciprocity is indeed compelling enough. 
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Section 1: The 2016 IPI Amended Proposal: Amendments to the 2012 Initiative 
This section examines the background to the IPI proposal. It looks as the original 2012 proposal 
before the amendments put forward in the 2016 IPI Amended Proposal. The assessment then 
seeks to identify how well the concerns identified during its passage through the European 
Institutions have been addressed in the 2016 IPI Amended Proposal. 
The EU has historically been active in seeking to expand the level playing field in world 
procurement markets. It has perceived these efforts to be in the face of an entrenched reluctance 
from many countries to allow for the participation of EU operators and products in their 
procurement tenders.  The EU was a major advocate of public procurement liberalization under 
the GATT Procurement Codes, while the 1994 WTO GPA was itself based on key EU concepts 
surrounding the appropriate design and execution of procurement contracts. This was in part 
because at the time the EU had one of the most developed public procurement regulatory 
frameworks internationally. The Revised GPA further displays the influence of the EU in the 
designed of the right to appeal clauses, the judicial review mechanism, and e-procurement, for 
these were all part of previous EU legislation. The WTO Revised GPA’s newly adopted Works 
Programmes were also included at the request of the EU after it had successfully negotiated this 
with other parties’ delegations. The Works Programme reflects the EU’s policy priorities, such as 
sustainable procurement and SMEs in procurement.7 As such, the EU has been very successful in 
promoting its public procurement agenda to the WTO through the GPA, as well as in its attempt 
to transfer EU practices in the globally lucrative market of public procurement.  
Yet with the EU these efforts are not seen to be effective enough. Many third countries remain 
reluctant to open their procurement markets to EU and/or international competition, or to open 
their markets further than what they have already done. And this has become more noticeable in 
the wake of the economic crisis. Indeed, the European Commission estimates that more than half 
of the world's procurement market is currently closed due to protectionist measures. 
Consequently, only €10 billion of EU exports (0.08% of EU GDP) reach foreign procurement 
markets, leaving an estimated €12 billion of unrealized EU exports because of such third-country 
restrictions. 8   These restrictions affect competitive EU sectors such as construction, public 
transport, medical devices, power generation and pharmaceuticals.  
Perhaps frustrated or inspired by the conclusions of the market access negotiations in 2011 that 
were to be scheduled under the Revised WTO GPA and the limited offers being put forward by 
accession parties such as China, the European Commission floated a proposal, in March 2012, to 
regulate unilaterally the access of third-country goods and services to the EU’s internal market in 
public procurement. The 2012 European Commission proposal was designed to encourage greater 
reciprocity on the part of trading partners, vis-à-vis access to the public procurement contracts. 
The 2012 Proposal put forward a draft regulation under which the European Commission could 
either autonomously or following an allegation from an EU Member State’s contracting agent or 
other interested party, investigate any allegation into the specific tender to assess where there was 
a lack of substantial reciprocity or insufficient transparency to make such a judgment. If the 
country concerned was unwilling to provide satisfactory solutions to any substantiated allegation 
of a restrictive procurement measure within 15 months, the European Commission would have 
the mandate to disqualify those tenders made up for more than 50% of goods or services 
originating in the country concerned; and/or  impose what it called “a mandatory price penalty” 
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on those goods or services tendered which originate in the country concerned.  A contracting 
agent could trigger also the regulation to exclude any qualifying procurement tender, as long as 
the value of ‘non-covered goods and services’ exceeded 50% of the total value of a tender valued 
at €5m or above.9 
There were visible difficulties with the proposed ‘optional’ 2012 regulation.10 For instance, its ad 
hoc implementation at both the Member State and Commission level meant that its application 
could be uneven, threatening to fragment the EU’s single market - contra Article 207 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). This rule stipulates, among other 
things, that the EU’s common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles. The 2012 
proposal could have entailed that companies that place bids in markets where the contracting 
authorities or the European Commission are pro-actively seeking reciprocity would find less 
competition – or a more positive discrimination - for a contract because of the penalties imposed 
on the companies of non-reciprocating parties. In other words, the decision to exclude a non-
reciprocating bid could entail excluding the best ‘value for money.’ It could also entail excluding 
those goods and services from EU firms that may supply to the excluded bid. Adding further to its 
uncertain consequences, unlike the ‘standing’ requirement under EU laws such as anti-dumping, 
disappointed EU bidding firms were also provided standing to initiate an investigation under the 
2012 proposal.  
There were other potentially problematic interpretative ambiguities identifiable in the 2012 
Proposal. In those procurement tenders cases identified as originating in non-reciprocal markets, 
the EU would undertake consultations with the government concerned. If these consultations 
were unsuccessful, the European Commission was able to ‘temporarily’ disqualify the non-
reciprocating country from the EU procurement market – without a clear definition of temporality 
in this context. The possibility to impose price penalties was similarly not defined, providing the 
European Commission with further discretion in their punitive application, and consequently less 
legal stability and uncertainty in their legality under the GATT/WTO. As discussed further 
below, the proposed regulation could potentially be challenged as a discriminatory measure under 
Article III National Treatment obligations, depending on whether the procurement in question 
could qualify for the derogation to Article III.4 National Treatment obligations, set out under 
Article III.8(a).11 Further, the imposition of any price preference or offset could also potentially 
be challenged under the ASCM as a specific subsidy prohibited under Article 3.12 
The 2012 Proposal met a mixed reaction at the Member State level and the Council was unable 
subsequently to take a formal position on its adoption. Some Member States were concerned 
about the very principle of closing down the EU market for goods and services originating in 
certain third countries. There were also fears about the risk of retaliation by the EU's trading 
partners, as well as the fact that the initiative could endanger the status of the EU as an adherent 
of open markets. Others signaled strong support due to the ‘unfair’ and detrimental nature of non-
reciprocity. Somewhere in-between were those Member States who questioned whether an undue 
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or disproportionate administrative burden would be imposed on both businesses and contracting 
agencies, as a consequence of the proposal.  
Yet over and above this dissonance at the Member State level, there was still a general perception 
that an imbalance currently exists between the openness of the EU procurement market and third 
country procurement markets. Moreover, that this should be addressed so that European 
companies can enjoy better access to procurement opportunities abroad. As a result, the EP 
Plenary endorsed the mandate for trilogue, together with a list of amendments to respond to some 
of the concerns both legislative organs of the EU have expressed and in October 2014, the new 
European Parliament confirmed the decision taken under previous legislative term and prepared 
for trilogue. The 2015 Commission Work Programme (CWP) then announced its intention to 
amend the 2012 proposal to bring it into line with the priorities of the new Commission: i) 
simplify the procedures ii) shortening timelines of investigation and iii) reducing the number of 
actors in the implementation".  
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Section 2: The Evolution of the 2016 IPI Amended Proposal 
  
 
The 2016 IPI Amended Proposal applies13 to the procurement covered under the revised EU 
procurement directives covering: concessions contracts;14  goods contracts;15  and contracts for 
utilities.16   It faithfully reiterates the text of the WTO GPA and the GATT Article III.8(a) 
derogation in stipulated that the regulation:  
… shall only apply where the goods or services are procured for governmental purposes. It 
shall not apply where the goods are purchased with a view to commercial resale or with a view 
to use in the production of goods for commercial sale. It shall not apply where the services are 
purchased with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the supply of services for 
commercial sale.17  
 
This deliberate textual compatibility with both the WTO GPA and GATT Article III.8(a) would 
hope to facilitate any interpretation in harmony with a similar assessment under the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism (See Section 3). Moreover, the 2016 IPI Amended Proposal Article 1 
provision specifically provides that the regulation shall apply only with regard to restrictive 
and/or discriminatory procurement measures or practices implemented by a third country in 
respect of purchases of non-covered goods and services, and its application shall be without 
prejudice to any international obligations of the Union. That is, the procurement covered by any 
trade agreement signed with the EU will be exempt from the application of the regulation. An 
additional safeguard is offered pursuant to the exceptions set out under Article 12. Here, EU 
contracting authorities and contracting entities have the discretion to decide not to apply the price 
adjustment measure with respect to a procurement or a concession procedure if there are no EU 
Union and/or covered goods or services available which meet the requirements of the contracting 
authority or contracting entity, or if the application of the measure would lead to a 
disproportionate increase in the price or costs of the contract. 
This IPI Proposal appears to have learned from the experience of the Buy America regulation in 
the US. The two provisions set out under Article 12 IPI play a similar role as the “saving clauses” 
set out in the ‘Buy America’ policy under of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA). Section 1605 of the ARRA sets out a general requirement to use only iron, steel and 
other manufactured goods produced in the US applies to both federal ARRA-funded public 
building and works projects, and all state and local ARRA grant-funded public buildings and 
works projects. However, it shall not apply in any case in which the head of the Federal 
department or agency involved finds, inter alia, that it would be inconsistent with the public 
interest, or there would be insufficient supplies and of a satisfactory quality, if their inclusion 
would increase the cost of the overall project by more than 25 per cent, or it is found to be 
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inconsistent with United States obligations under international agreements.18  
While the 2016 IPI instrument maintains the original EU objective of encouraging greater 
reciprocity on the part of trading partners’ vis-à-vis access to the public procurement contracts, 
the overall proposal has been both refined and ring-fenced. The 2016 IPI Amended Proposal now 
proposes to limit any possible restrictive measures to “price adjustment measures” and exclude 
the possibility of completely disqualifying the tender. Moreover, the proposed regulation 
centralizes decision-making, removing the ability for the Member State procurement agencies or 
interested parties to trigger the regulation directly. This 2016 IPI Amended Proposal also 
addresses the concerns raised by the Member States about undue administrative costs, for by 
centralizing decision-making to the Commission it swiftly minimizes any potential administrative 
burden on both Member States and contracting agencies. Nevertheless, Member States are 
required to indicate the procuring entities that will be implementing the price adjustment measure. 
The time frames accorded to the Commission for investigating the claim have been shortened, 
while transparency has been increased with the requirement that all findings from any 
investigations into barriers to tenders in third countries must be made public.  
As with the 2012 Proposal, the new proposed price adjustment measure can be applied to bidders 
or products or services from that country following a Commission investigation determining that 
a third party country is applying barriers to EU participation in its procurement market. However, 
there is now to be a presumption that a negative price preference will be imposed to level out the 
playing field of that particular procurement market. This presumption will be upheld unless the 
bidder can prove that less than 50% of the total value of their tender is made up of ‘non-covered’ 
goods and services originating in this third country. The proposal also permits targeting territories 
at both the regional or local level, like states, regions or even municipalities.  
Other exceptions are provided under the 2016 IPI Amended Proposal Article 4, where more than 
50% of the total value of the tender is made up of goods and/or services originating in least-
developed countries,19 and in certain developing countries.20 Article 5 sets out an exemption for 
tenders submitted by EU SMEs established with a direct and effect link with the economy of at 
least one Member State, as well as for developing countries bidders or products, as long as they 
are subject to GSP+ treatment.21  The IPI proposal also includes various other transparency, 
monitoring and reporting requirement both for the successful tender and for the contracting 
agencies. This brings the proposal in line with wider EU policies. 
The 2016 IPI Amended Proposal sends out warning signals to its bilateral trading partners, fellow 
GPA parties and acceding- and observer-status GPA parties alike, to incentivize them to expand 
on their EU government procurement market access commitments. This proposed regulation 
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suggests that if the EU does not like the terms of a third party’s market coverage of procurement, 
it could seek to remedy this situation outside of the GPA Agreement. The 2016 IPI Amended 
Proposal provides some punitive economic incentives and thus legislative push to third parties 
who have not opened up their procurement under either an RTA with the EU or under the WTO 
GPA, as well as those GPA parties who have not opened up a particular procurement market to 
the EU under their Annexes to Appendix 1. Indeed, the IPI wishes to be implemented widely, for 
if a contracting authority or contracting entity intends not to apply a price adjustment measures, it 
must indicate this in the contract notice that it publishes22 and notify the Commission within ten 
calendar days of publication.  
Under the 2016 IPI Amended Proposal, if after an investigation determining that bidders or 
products or services from a third party country is applying barriers to EU participation in its 
procurement market the Commission and the third party country must undergo consultations for 
up to 15 months. Article 7 states that if after the initiation of consultations, it appears that the 
most appropriate means to end a restrictive and/or discriminatory procurement measure or 
practice is the conclusion of an international agreement, negotiations shall be carried out in 
accordance with Articles 207 and 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU). The Commission can terminate such consultations if the country concerned undertakes 
international commitments agreed with the Union either through accession to the WTO GPA or 
expanding its market access commitments to the EU under the WTO GPA, or otherwise through 
the conclusion of a bilateral agreement with the Union which includes market access 
commitments in the field of public procurement and/or concessions.  
If this soft leverage does not result in the reciprocity the EU is seeking, Article 11.1 of the IPI 
proposal provides for the possibility to apply price adjustment measures to those contested 
tenders submitted by economic operators originating in the third country concerned or tenders 
offering goods and services originating in the third country concerned - if the value of those 
goods and services accounts for more than 50 per cent of the total value of the tender. However, 
this price adjustment measure shall apply only for the purpose of the evaluation and ranking of 
the price component of the tenders. It does not affect the price due to be paid under the contract, 
for this will subsequently be concluded with the successful tenderer. This suggests that despite all 
of the efforts at non-discrimination, transparency and accountability in procurement processes, a 
non-transparent price negotiation takes place with the winning tenderer that may conceivably 
result in the final cost of the tender being set at more than a losing bid from a disappointed 
competitor. 
 
 
2.1 Following the Buy America Model under the ARRA 
 
The experience of the impact of the Buy America Act may have been instructive in the design of 
the Commission’s 2016 IPI Amended Proposal.  Under the Buy America Act, a so-called ‘saving 
clause’ was included under Section 1605, to ensure that any implementation of the Act must be 
compatible with its international commitments under the WTO GPA. Nevertheless, the Buy 
America regulation was still able to provide unprecedented market access leverage over other 
countries, most notably a fellow GPA party and NAFTA signatory – Canada.  
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The pressure imposed upon Canada as result of the ARRA meant that it was forced to respond to 
by rapidly negotiating the 2010 AGP with the US.23 Under the 2010 AGP, Canada provided US 
companies with a greater degree of permanent access to procurement markets in all provinces and 
territories except Nunavut. In exchange, the United States simply extended its 1994 WTO GPA 
commitments on sub-national procurement, which cover 37 US states, to Canada.  The US did not 
increase its market access commitments under the Schedules of the WTO 1994 GPA. The US had 
previously refused to exempt Canadian businesses from its small business set-asides and other 
exemptions, so Canada had retaliated by refusing to expand its WTO GPA commitments to 
include sub-national procurement in 1994.24 Evidently, the leverage that the ARRA offered the 
US outside of the GPA was enough to motivate Canada to give US firms access to Canadian 
provincial and territorial government procurement. And this concession was without Canada 
making any progress on the issue of small business set-asides or other US exemptions at the 
WTO.25  The ARRA had a significantly detrimental economic effect on Canadian businesses 
without violating the WTO GPA. It illustrates how to exert influence on market access 
liberalisation, even over GPA parties, while utilising the restrictive nature of both reciprocity 
principle and the most favoured nation obligation operating under the WTO GPA to avoid non-
compliance with the agreement.  
 
The European Commission’s 2016 IPI Amended Proposal appears to follow this model. 
However, rather than putting forward the proposal forward accompanied by the same rhetorical of 
economic nationalism and domestic job protection, the Commission appears to be justifying the 
2016 IPI Amended Proposal with the rhetoric of reciprocity. 
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Section 3. Reciprocity under the WTO GPA 
Reciprocity, or the practice of lowering barriers to trade in return for similar concessions from 
another country, is the core principle behind this proposed scheme. Reciprocity in the context of 
government procurement concessions is the rule by which several parties manage to maintain a 
balance and symmetry of treatment by granting the same or equivalent rights and benefits to each 
other. Reciprocity under international procurement agreements is strictly conditional in that it is 
contingent on rewarding actions. And moreover, it ceases when such actions cease; for while the 
act of giving is voluntary, the act of the recipient in obligatory. That is, government procurement 
market liberalization has traditionally been conditional on an explicitly strict reciprocal exchange 
of rights and obligations. It should not be confused with open or unconditional reciprocity, which 
does not demand any direct response to an antecedent action. Open reciprocity and most-favoured 
nation treatment characterize the negotiations followed under the GATT, which has faced 
criticisms that such unconditional reciprocity and MFN actually encourages free-riders in 
permitting non-reciprocity on the part of some countries.  
From its inception, then, the plurilateral Government Procurement Code sought to address the 
free-rider problem and the lack of full reciprocity that the EU is currently concerned with. The 
WTO GPA’s strict reciprocity principle and conditionality is formally set out in an appendix and 
forms an integral part of the Agreement. 26  The Annexes are negotiated along four basic 
parameters, consisting of: i) the value of procurementcovering only contracts estimated to 
exceed a certain value threshold; ii) the identity of the procuring entitycovering only those 
listed by each party in its annexes; iii) the type of goods or services procuredconsisting of all 
goods, apart from some expressly excluded by each party, and only services listed by each party 
in its annexes; and iv) the origin of the goods or servicesincluding only countries that are GPA 
parties. During the GPA negotiations, not only must the parties decide which services and goods 
and construction are covered by the obligations, but they must also negotiate which contracting 
authorities or entities will be included in Annex I-III and then, additionally, the value of the 
thresholds that will trigger the scope of application of the agreement in each case and category of 
procurement.  Parties to the GPA also commonly qualify the scope of the coverage of their 
obligations within their Annexes to Appendix 1. The OECD has estimated that if reciprocity is 
not taken into consideration, that is, if the commitments are applied on an unconditional MFN 
basis among WTO GPA parties, the average level of commitments would be 16% higher than that 
with reciprocity. High impacts (more than 25 percentage points) are observed in space transport 
services and banking services, while there is relatively no impact in construction services.27  
 
The key objective of the EU’s IPI Proposal is for more market access reciprocity to improve the 
unfair conditions under which EU businesses competes for public contracts abroad. The EU has 
estimated that it is the most open of all procurement markets for the “de jure” openness of the EU 
procurement markets is 85%, while for the U.S. it is only at 32%.28 However, the most available 
data rather suggests that the US and the EU achieved a balance in the value of market access 
concessions in government procurement. Messerlin has indicated that the openness of the EU and 
the U.S. towards third countries (non-EU and non-US) in public procurement is around both 4-
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(e.g. utilities); 4) goods; 5) services coverage; 6) coverage of construction services; and 7) General Notes. 
27
  Asako Ueno. Multilateralising Regionalism on Government Procurement. OECD Trade Policy Paper 
No. 151. 2013.  
28
 Quoted in: Patrick Messerlin. The Beauty of Public Procurement in TTIP. ECIPE Bulletin No. 1/2016. 
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5%, depending on the set of data. In fact, as Figure 1 indicates, the EU was less open than the 
U.S. until the late 2000s, and did not catch up with the U.S. until the 2008 financial crisis.29  
 
Figure 1. The EU27 and US Penetration Ratios Selected Years30 
 
 
Box 1 illustrates how the EU specifies in its General Notes that the GPA applies only to the 
services listed in their commitments, in respect of a given party, and only to the extent that this 
Party has given reciprocal access to the service concerned.31 Similar Scheduled Notes accompany 
their other Annexes.  Thus while the statements that accompany the 2016 and 2012 Proposals 
imply that the current market concessions situation is unfair an overview of the EU market access 
concessions set out under the Revised GPA refutes this and highlights the strict reciprocity 
already operating under the EU’s WTO GPA schedules. That is, EU negotiators did negotiate 
symmetrical concessions under the WTO GPA schedules based on strict reciprocity and highly 
conditional MFN. 
Box 1 EU Schedules Notes to Annex 3 
6 The following shall not be considered as covered procurement: 
 a. procurement by procuring entities operating in the fields of: 
i production, transport or distribution of drinking water covered under this Annex; 
ii production, transport or distribution of electricity covered under this Annex; 
iii airport facilities covered under this Annex; 
iv maritime or inland port or other terminal facilities covered under this Annex; and 
v urban railway, tramway, trolley bus or bus services covered under this Annex in regard of 
supplies, services, suppliers and service providers from Canada; 
b. procurement by procuring entities operating in the field of production, transport or 
distribution of drinking water covered under this Annex in regard of suppliers and service 
providers from the United States; 
                                                        
29
 Patrick Messerlin. The Beauty of Public Procurement in TTIP. ECIPE Bulletin No. 1/2016. 
30
 Reproduced from Patrick Messerlin, ibid.  
31
 https://e-gpa.wto.org/report/coverage 
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c. procurement by procuring entities operating in the field of maritime or inland port or other 
terminal facilities covered under this Annex of dredging services or related to shipbuilding in 
regard of suppliers and service providers from the United States; 
d. procurement by procuring entities covered under this Annex of air traffic control equipment 
in regard of suppliers and service providers from the United States; 
 e. procurement by procuring entities operating in the field of airport facilities covered under 
this Annex in regard of  suppliers and service providers from the United States and Korea; 
 f. procurement by procuring entities operating in the field of urban railway, tramway, 
trolleybus or bus services   covered under this Annex in regard of suppliers and service 
providers from the United States; 
g. procurement by procuring entities operating in the field of urban railway covered under this 
Annex in regard of suppliers and service providers from Japan; 
h. procurement by procuring entities operating in the field of railways covered under this 
Annex in regard of goods, suppliers, services and service providers from Armenia; Canada; 
Japan; the United States; Hong Kong, China; Singapore and the Separate Customs Territory of 
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu; 
i procurement by procuring entities operating in the field of high-speed railways and high-speed 
railways infrastructure in regard of goods, suppliers, services and service providers from Korea; 
j. procurement by procuring entities covered under this Annex of good or service components 
of procurement which are not themselves covered procurement in regard of suppliers and 
service providers from the United States; 
k. procurement by procuring entities operating in the field of production, transport or 
distribution of electricity covered under this Annex in regard of suppliers and services 
providers from Japan; 
l. procurement by procuring entities operating in the field of production, transport and 
distribution of electricity covered under this Annex …(electrical transformers, plugs, switches 
and insulated cables) in regard of suppliers from Korea; 
m. procurement by procuring entities operating in the field of production, transport and 
distribution of electricity covered under this Annex … in regard of suppliers from Israel; 
n. procurement by procuring entities operating in the field of bus services covered under this 
Annex in regard of suppliers and service providers from Israel; 
until such time, the EU has accepted that the Parties concerned provide satisfactory 
reciprocal access to EU goods, suppliers, services and service providers to their own 
procurement markets. [emphasis added] 
 
In sum, the 2016 IPI Amended Proposal has followed the model of the US Buy America Act 
under the ARRA and its success in opening previously closed markets in Canada, a fellow 
NAFTA and GPA party. The EU has done this without the rhetoric of buy national or economic 
nationalism. Nonetheless, the 2016 IPI Amended Proposal quietly seeks to open up procurement 
markets through negotiations, consultations or ultimately by threatening or actually imposing 
sanctions through price adjustment instruments. While this may not be actionable under the WTO 
GPA, given that it explicitly does not relate to ‘covered procurement’, it nevertheless works 
against the general principles of the multilateralism and non-discrimination under GATT/WTO.  
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4. Challenging the IPI Proposal under the GATT 
Government procurement rules can be characterized as an internal regulatory measure, and as 
such subject to the non-discrimination requirements that are the cornerstone of the GATT/WTO. 
It was however explicitly carved out from the subsequent GATT Article III national treatment 
obligations by virtue of GATT Article III:8(a), which states: 
The provisions of this Article shall not apply to laws, regulations or 
requirements governing the procurement by governmental agencies of 
products purchased for governmental purposes and not with a view to 
commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods for 
commercial sale. [Emphasis added] 
This text, as noted above, is mirrored in the EU 2016 IPI Amended Proposal definition of 
procurement. Nevertheless, there were different interpretations put forward under the Panel and 
Appellate Body reports of the same WTO dispute over Canada–Feed-in Tariffs (FIT) 
programme, when given the task of defining procurement for the purposes of the application of 
Article III.8(a). The FIT dispute emerged when Japan and the EU challenged the legality of the 
domestic content requirements set out in the FIT scheme established by the Canadian Province of 
Ontario.32 The EU challenged this measure on the grounds that the GATT III.8 (a) derogation 
could not apply to the FIT programme because only those government departments directly using 
the procured goods or services are immune from Article III’s national treatment obligations.33 
The EU claimed that the meaning of procurement for governmental purposes as set out in Article 
III.8 (a) is narrow. It is restricted to acquisitions made to meet ‘the needs’ of government. To 
qualify as a government procurement, any purchase must pass a ‘needs’ test to ensure that it is 
indeed intended ‘for the direct benefit or use of the government’.34  The EU challenge also 
proposed a broad reading of Article III.8 (a) when defining ‘not with a view to commercial resale 
or with a view to use in the production of goods for commercial sale’. The EU claimed that if the 
purchased product is sold or introduced into the market regardless of whether this is done for 
profit, it should be deemed to be ‘with a view to commercial resale’, and thus disqualified from 
the derogation. As such, this interpretation sought to exclude more types of government 
procurement that distort competition in open markets from the safe haven of the Article III.8(a) 
derogation.  
 
Unlike the EU, however, the Panel Report submit that the derogation would not be available if the 
electricity was purchased ‘with a view to commercial resale’ because the resales were made in 
competition with licensed electricity retailers. And although profit was made by the Government 
of Ontario from resale of FIT Programme electricity to consumers, this was a necessary 
requirement for the procurement to be considered for commercial resale: ‘loss-making sales can 
be, and often are, a part of ordinary commercial activity.’ 35  The Panel then assessed the 
challenged measures – the offset - and reasoned that as there could not be any procurement of 
electricity without meeting this domestic content requirement, the requirement could be said to 
                                                        
32
 A FIT is an increasingly employed instrument for promoting investment in renewable energy typically 
through fixed pricing for the purchases of renewable energy power above the market price for electricity. 
33
 Canada–Renewable Energy, Third Party Written Submission of the US, paras. 13 and 14 
34
 Canada–FIT, First Written Submission by the EU, paras. 118 –30. 
35
 Panel Report, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation WT/DS412/R 
adopted 24 May 2013. para 7.122   -7.151. 
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govern procurement for the purposes of the Article III.8(a) derogation. As Davies notes, here 
critically, the Panel opened up the possibility that there need not be any competitive relationship 
between the products discriminated against and the products procured for the derogation to 
apply.36 
This controversial interpretation was revised on appeal. The Appellate Body instead based its 
reasoning on the ‘products purchased’ when determining whether the FIT offset requirement did 
indeed govern the procurement. The Appellate Body submit instead that the Article III.8(a) 
derogation only becomes relevant once it has been determined that there is discriminatory 
treatment of the foreign product that is covered by the obligations in Article III. And only then, 
did it determine that such discrimination was the consequence of any laws, regulations, or 
requirements governing the procurement by governmental agencies. In sum: a purchase that does 
not fulfil the requirements of being made ‘for governmental purposes’ will not be considered to 
fall within the derogation of Article III.8 (a). This condition is regardless of whether the 
procurement in question complies with the requirement of being made ‘not with a view to 
commercial resale’37 because these are cumulative requirements.38  
Having determined the nature of the measure being challenged, the FIT Appellate Body assessed 
whether the product of foreign origin was actually in a competitive or directly substitutable 
relationship with the product purchased. It undertook a like-product analysis to allow for some 
conclusions to be made as to whether Canada’s FIT programme was disrupting international 
competitors’ sales of renewable energy generating equipment, as claimed by the EU and Japan.  
The Appellate Body concluded that the product being procured was electricity, whereas the 
product discriminated against for reason of its origin was generation equipment, and that these 
two products are not in a competitive relationship. Therefore, the scheme was not covered by the 
Article III.8(a) derogation. Consequently, the FIT scheme fell under application of the GATT 
Article III.4 national treatment obligations and in favouring domestic over foreign products, the 
FIT scheme was found to be in violation of GATT Article III.4.  
The Appellate Body’s legal assessment was faithfully followed in a subsequent, similar 
WTO dispute involving India’s domestic content requirements relating to Solar Cells and 
Modules.39  Yet unlike the later dispute, in Canada- FIT, the Appellate Body also assessed 
the legality of the same measure under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 
This move suggested that with or without the GATT Article III.8(a) derogation and, moreover, 
whether or not a WTO GPA party has excluded a specific procuring entity or market from its 
Appendix 1 Annexes, there is no safe haven from the application of the ASCM to those 
government procurement measures that relate to goods. That is, even if the 2016 IPI Amended 
Proposal is not in violation of the WTO GPA obligations, it is not necessarily freed from the 
obligations of either the GATT or the ASCM.  
 
At face value it could be assumed that because the 2016 IPI Amended Proposal Article XX states 
that the application of regulation must be consistent with international obligations, the proposed 
regulation would be not likely to violate the ASCM. On the other hand, it is also difficult to 
conclude that a price adjustment instrument or local content requirement, prohibited under ASCM 
                                                        
36
 Arwel Davies. Op cit. p4. 
37
 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, WT/DS412/AB/R / 
WT/DS426/AB/R, adopted 24 May 2013, paras. 5.59, 5.60, 5.61. 
38
 Ibid. para. 5.69. 
39
 India — Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules (WT/DS456/PR), 24 February 
2016. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds456_e.htm#bkmk456r 
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Article 3, would not be deemed to be a ‘benefit’ if it were specifically designed to have impact as 
a leverage mechanism. The Panel Report for the Indonesia – Autos dispute likened minimum 
required domestic content levels to domestic content requirements. The Panel opined that "by 
definition, [domestic content requirements] always favour the use of domestic products over 
imported products, and therefore affect trade".40 Part II of the ASCM Agreement provides in 
Article 3 that Members shall neither grant nor maintain (non-agricultural) subsidies contingent, 
whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon the use of domestic over imported 
goods. The proposed 2016 IPI Amended Proposal price adjustment mechanism confers a benefit 
of up to 50% to those tenders that do not originate from parties that are not offering strictly 
reciprocal access to their procurement markets. As such is not simply discriminatory, but it is an 
unfair practice potentially prohibited in offering a benefit through domestic content requirements.  
 
 
4.1 The IPI and Horizontal Policy Objectives: Small Medium Enterprise Promotion 
In the legislative procedure leading to the adoption of the 2014 Procurement Directives, one of 
the main focuses of the EU was to improve the possibilities and conditions for participation of 
SMEs41 in public procurement covered by the EU rules.42 Approximately 20.8 million SMEs are 
registered in the EU. This represents 99.8% of all enterprises, and produces more than a half of 
European GDP. It is therefore of little surprise that SMEs are now the prime focus of European 
public policy and promoting their access to public procurement is an explicit objective of the 
2014 Directive. This is stressed in Recital 2, ‘Public procurement plays a key role in the Europe 
2020 strategy … For that purpose, the public procurement rules adopted pursuant to [the 2004 
Directive] should be revised and modernised in order to increase the efficiency of public 
spending, facilitating in particular the participation of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs)’. And, even in clearer terms, in Recital 78: ‘Public procurement should be adapted to the 
needs of SMEs’. Article 83(3) of the 2014 Directive provides for increased monitoring at the 
national level and for an obligation on Member States to transmit to the Commission every three 
years a monitoring report covering information on inter alia the level of SME participation (see 
also Recitals 124 and 134). Yet, despite the SME focus in the negotiations leading up to the 2014 
Directive and the numerous references to SMEs in its Recitals, these Directives contains few 
rules that can substantively promote the participation of SMEs in EU level competitions for 
public contracts.  
There are four main policy instruments for promoting the participation of SMEs in public 
procurements that are of relevance here. Firstly, it is possible to change procurement procedures 
to facilitate competition by SMEs. This avenue suggests increased transparency, and improved 
economic and administrative methods to facilitate smaller businesses. 43  The second option 
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 Panel Report, Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WT/DS54/R, 
WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R adopted 23 July 1998, ¶14.82. 
41
 As defined under the Commission recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, 
small and medium-sized enterprises (OJ L 124, 20.5.2003, p. 36). 
42
 This focus was initiated in the Commission’s Europe 2020 A strategy for smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth, COM(2010) 2020 final, and was clearly visible in the Green paper on the modernisation 
of EU public procurement policy Towards a more efficient European Procurement Market, COM(2011) 15 
final and was one of five main aims in the 2011 Proposal. 
43
 See for example: SMEs' access to public procurement markets and aggregation of demand in the EU. 
2015. PwC, ICF GHK and Ecorys; The Access of SMEs to Public Procurement Contracts (2004) prepared 
by EIM Business and Policy Research and KMU Forschung Austria for DG Enterprise and Industry. 
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involves providing direct subsidies to SMEs by the government. European SMEs benefit from EU 
funding through grants, loans or, guarantees. Subsidy support is available both directly (EU 
grants) and through programmes managed at national level. SMEs can also benefit from a series 
of non-financial assistance measures in the form of programmes and business support services.44 
Third, a common policy is to offer price preferences in procurement evaluations. Here, as 
discussed previously in relation to the 2016 IPI Amended Proposal, government will add a 
percentage onto the price of large business so as to provide SMEs competing in the procurement a 
greater chance of being successful in winning a contract award.45 Finally, there is the policy 
instrument of providing set asides of specific procurements for SMEs. For example, in the US, 
the federal government establishes formal goals to ensure small businesses get a share of work in 
the federal market. Every federal government purchase valued from $2,500 to $100,000 is 
automatically set aside for SMEs, provided that there are at least two companies that can provide 
the product or service.46 However, the 2014 Directive includes only one of these measures – 
changing procurement procedures to facilitate SME participation.47 
 
Following the 2014 Procurement Directive, the IPI Proposal also notes that because of their size 
and limited capacity SMEs often face particular problems because of burdensome procedures. It 
too seeks to promote SME participation in the economy, in line with the general SME policy of 
the EU, and wider EU Trade Policy. Consequently, pursuant to the 2016 IPI Amended Proposal 
Article 5, those tenders submitted by SMEs established in the EU and engaged in substantive 
business operations,48 shall be exempted from this Regulation. However, this exclusion is of 
questionable value in promoting SME participation in procurement markets either in the EU or 
abroad. From the outset, the high value threshold makes it unlikely that smaller companies would 
be concerned by the instrument. But more generally, given that the aim of the objective is to 
provide the EU with leverage to open up procurement markets in third countries or procurement 
markets not yet opened up under the WTO GPA, it is not clear how this regulation would have 
applied to SMEs, but for the Article 5 exclusion. The price adjustment mechanism might operate 
in their favour as for any other domestic bidder, if they are in a position to tender for a bid valued 
at above 500,000 euros, but that possibility does not require protecting or pronouncing in a 
specific SME rule.  
The 2016 IPI Amended Proposal Article 5 SME provision appears to be another act of lip service 
that has emerged in EU policies aiming to promote SMEs in recent years.49 The EU is legally 
                                                        
44
 Small businesses and start-ups were the major beneficiaries from the Competitiveness and Innovation 
framework programme (CIP) 2007 and 2013. More than EUR 1.1 billion of EU funding was directed to 
loan and risk capital investment to help 350,000 SMEs start up, grow and innovate. A further EUR 2.6 
billion will fund actions to help SMEs bring innovative ideas to market, to apply ICT and renewable energy 
technologies, and benefit more fully from the internal market. 
45For instance, in April 2012, the Cabinet of the Government of India approved the Public Procurement 
Bill, which recognizes SME preference schemes, among others, that set an annual goal of procuring a 
minimum of 20% of goods and services from micro entities and SMEs in India. See SMEs, Public 
Procurement and Inclusive Growth. Asian Development Bank. 
http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/30070/sme-development.pdf 
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 Available at: http://www.gsa.gov/portal/category/108231 
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 See Dawar, K and Skalova, M. The Evolution of EU Public Procurement Rules and its Interface with the 
WTO: SME promotion and policy space. In: Sanchez Graells & Skovgaard Ølykke (eds) Reformation or 
Deformation of EU Procurement Directives. Edward Elgar. Forthcoming 2016. 
48
 This entails have a direct and effective link with the economy of at least one Member State. 
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 E.g. Implementing the Community Lisbon Programme – Modern SME policy for Growth and 
Employment, 10.11.2005, COM(2005) 551 final; Small and medium-sized enterprises – Key for delivering 
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constrained by the WTO GPA with regard to promoting or protecting SMEs in those government 
procurement markets covered by the agreement. For while the WTO provides ex ante options for 
the parties to negotiate to promote their SMEs and various parties have inscribed such 
possibilities in their Annexes, it is significant for the legality of EU SME promotion in 
procurement markets, that the EU has not. From the very outset of the negotiations to the 1994 
WTO GPA, the EU did not seek to negotiate carve out protections from the GPA’s obligations for 
SMEs and it did not aim to negotiate concessions that matched the SME objectives of other 
parties. This is because the internal EU (then, the European Community) procurement directives 
were promulgated to liberalize the internal market among its Member States. The rationale 
underlying the Procurement Directives, and therefore the principles embodied in the Directives, 
are historically based on trade liberalization.50  Moreover, not only did the EU did not fully 
exercise its potential to exclude SME’s from the scope of the access to the EU’s public 
procurement market, EU negotiators rather sought to explicitly discriminate against and penalise 
the United States (US), Korea and Japan for their promotion of SMEs under their respective GPA 
Appendix 1 Annexes. The EU’s Notes to Annex 1 stipulate that:  
The provisions of Article XVIII requiring Domestic Review Procedures shall not apply to 
suppliers and service providers of Japan, Korea and the US in contesting the award of 
contracts to a supplier or service provider of Parties other than those mentioned, which 
are small or medium sized enterprises under the relevant provisions of EU law, until such 
time as the EU accepts that they no longer operate discriminatory measures in favour of 
certain domestic small and minority businesses (emphasis added).51 
 
This historical stance has placed more recent EU efforts to promote SMEs in procurement 
markets in potential non-compliance with their international obligations under the WTO GPA. 
This legal constraint may explain why oftentimes SME promotion in international procurement 
markets has not resulted in a more comprehensive framework, such as in the US.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
more growth and jobs. - A mid-term review of Modern SME policy, 4.10.2007, COM(2007) 592 final; and 
“Think Small First” A “Small Business Act” for Europe, 25.6.2008, COM(2008) 394 final.  
50
 For discussion, see S. Arrowsmith, ‘The Purpose of the EU Procurement Directives: Ends, Means and the 
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Section 5. Conclusions  
The analysis undertaken in this paper suggests that while formally in compliance with the WTO 
GPA, the 2016 proposed IPI is potentially non compliant with GATT National Treatment 
obligations depending on the defined nature of the procurement in question, and the price 
adjustment mechanism may be seen as a domestic content requirement, prohibited under the 
WTO ASCM. This paper further submits that even though the 2016 IPI Amended Proposal is 
formally in compliance with the WTO GPA, it does not support the objectives of either the 
GATT/WTO or the WTO GPA – which are to open up markets to international competition under 
equal commercial conditions. It is also questionable whether the 2016 IPI Amended Proposal 
supports the stated aims of the EU - to promote value for money in public procurement along 
with the welfare of EU citizens, consumers and taxpayers.  
The reasonable proposition that EU businesses must become more competitive internationally 
should not be used to undermine value for money in government spending, or the indisputable 
benefits of multilateralism, non-discrimination and negotiating under the tutelage of the WTO. 
There is growing consensus that ensuring non-discriminatory, transparent and fair public 
procurement is the best way for citizens and tax-payers obtain the best public goods and services 
available, and at the best value for money. To achieve this aim, more competition is needed in 
procurement markets rather than less. Moreover, the principle of reciprocity should not be used to 
justify the unilateral imposition of a punitive measure in procurement markets, and ensure a 
‘matching’ of opportunities in third party markets. The 2016 IPI Amended Proposal, like its 
predecessor the 2012 draft regulation, could potentially function to provoke the creation of other 
‘buy national’ policies, or indeed unilateral retaliation by third countries facing such penalties.  
 
